A substantial literature identifies seller holdout as a serious obstacle to land assembly, implying that eminent domain is an appropriate policy response. We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to test this view. We find that when there is no competition and no eminent domain, land assembly suffers from costly delay and failed assembly; participants lose 18.1% of the available surplus. Much of the inefficiency is due to low offers from the buyers ("buyer holdout") rather than strategic holdout among sellers. When buyers can exercise eminent domain the participants lose 18.6% of the surplus. This loss comes from spending money to influence the fair market price and forcing sellers to sell even when the sellers value the property more than the buyer. Introducing weak competition in the form of a less valuable substitute parcel of land reduces delay by 35.7% and virtually eliminates assembly failure, so that only 11.5% of the surplus is lost.
I. Introduction
domain may lead to inefficient assembly and invite influence costs. Inefficient assembly occurs 23 where the sum of the fragmented owners' values for their land exceeds the value of the 4 A number of experimental studies of land assembly demonstrate that seller holdout does 48 occur and can be costly. ( We provide an overview of these results in the following section.) This 49 has led some investigators to suggest that eminent domain may be a necessary tool for efficient 50 land aggregation (Swope, et al. 2011 , Cadigan, et al. 2011 . However, to date the experimental 51 study of efficiency under a regime of eminent domain versus secure property is limited to a 52 single study (Kitchens and Roomets 2015) that omits several important features of the land across treatments. Participants captured an average of 91.7% of the available surplus with 137 contingent contracts and 93.2% with eminent domain. Thus, in their experimental environment 138 and institutions eminent domain was not welfare enhancing. 139 These results are informative and important, but Kitchens' and Roomets' (2015) 140 experimental design omits several features of the land assembly problem. First, they did not 141 incorporate costs of delayed assembly, so assembly failure was the only possible source of 142 inefficiency in their contingent contracts treatment. This is significant because strategic holdout 143 is a dominated strategy in a single-period negotiation with complete information. As noted 144 above, assembly failure does not occur frequently in land assembly experiments, thus the bulk of 145 inefficiency generally comes from costly delay. This omission may positively bias efficiency in 146 Kitchens ' and Roomets' (2015) contingent contracts treatment. 147 Second, the buyer's value for the assembled properties was always considerably greater 148 than the sum of the sellers' private use values. Thus, assembly failure posed the largest threat to 149 efficiency, and this could only occur in the contingent contracts treatment. There was no 150 possibility of inefficient assembly in the eminent domain treatment. This may positively bias 151 efficiency in their eminent domain treatment. 152 Third, buyers and sellers in these experiments faced a known fair market price that was 153 equal to the sellers' private use values. In actual cases of eminent domain the buyer and seller(s) 154 spend money in the courts because they expect to influence the price in their favor. 155 Finally, court costs in Kitchens ' and Roomets' (2015) experiments were determined 156 exogenously and fell only on the buyer. In the field sellers often expend resources on the legal court or many. Preventing the participants from making this decision on their own could bias efficiency in their eminent domain treatment positively or negatively.
161
The fact that efficiency may be overstated in the contingent contracts treatment and 162 overstated or understated in the eminent domain treatment makes it difficult to apply Kitchens' 163 and Roomets ' (2015) Our experiment design is inspired by the work of Shupp et al. (2013) , who investigated 170 land assembly under conditions of uncertainty regarding the valuations of the buyer and sellers. 171 We model an environment in which one buyer negotiates with two owners (the sellers) through a 172 finitely repeated process of offers and responses. 3 The buyer makes simultaneous independent 173 offers to the sellers, who may accept or reject them.
174
In our experiments each seller had a private valuation, , for his own parcel .
175
Valuations were denominated in "points" that were redeemed for cash at the end of the 176 experiment. monotonically increasing in all subsequent periods.
191
We tested land assembly within this general negotiation environment in three treatment 192 conditions. In the first (Baseline) the buyer's only profit opportunity was to purchase the parcels 193 from the sellers without recourse to eminent domain. In the second treatment (Competition) the 194 buyer could purchase a substitute parcel of land instead of assembling the fragmented parcels.
195
The substitute was not as valuable to the buyer as the fragmented parcels, however, so that the 196 competitive pressure on the sellers was weak. In the third treatment (Eminent Domain) the buyer Baseline buyers and sellers saw a matrix of two squares labeled (1) and (2), which represented the sellers' parcels. In the first negotiating period the buyer submitted simultaneous private 204 offers to both sellers. Each seller saw her offer in her square of the matrix and indicated her 205 decision by clicking one of two buttons labelled "accept" and "reject." Once a seller had 206 accepted an offer negotiations for her parcel concluded at the price she had agreed to. If at least 207 one seller had rejected her offer the negotiation went on to the next period. Contracts were 208 contingent; the buyer only paid a seller the agreed price if both sellers accepted an offer.
209
In a single-period negotiation the buyer's optimal strategy is simple to calculate because 210 sellers should accept any offer . Since the are drawn from the same distribution the 211 buyer has no reason to submit different offers to the two sellers, and so in equilibrium .
212
Thus, we omit the subscripts in the following analysis.
213
The buyer's expected profit, ( ), is a function of his value and offers:
The first term in (1) is the profit earned by the buyer if both sellers accept and the second term is 216 the probability that his offers exceed both of the their values. Solving the first order condition of
217
(1) for yields the equilibrium bid function:
218
(2)
219
With multiple bargaining periods it becomes difficult to succinctly model buyer behavior 220 after the first period because his best strategy will depend on his beliefs about the sellers.
221
Suppose at least one seller rejects her offer in period one. If the buyer believes that the sellers 222 would only reject an offer that is below their value then in the second period he will incorporate any accepted offer into the first term of equation (1), substitute the first period for in its 224 second term and solve for the new equilibrium offer. But if he believes that the sellers are 225 holding out strategically, then he will not change his offers in the second period. A third 226 possibility is that the buyer places a non-zero probability on the sellers rejecting strategically, in 227 which case he will revise his second period offer(s) upward, but by a smaller amount than if he 228 believed them to be sincere.
229
In their turn, the sellers' optimal behavior depends on their beliefs about the buyers' 230 beliefs. If they believe him to think they are strategic, then strategic holdout will not be 231 profitable because it will incur the delay cost without increasing the buyer's offers in period two.
232
If they believe him to think they will only reject sincerelyi.e., reject offers below their values -233 they will hold out in period 1 so long as the difference in equilibrium offers is greater than 234 .
235
The multiplicity of plausible outcomes implies that we cannot predict behavior in the 236 Baseline beyond period 1 with any confidence without knowing the beliefs of the agents.
237
However, earlier empirical work by Zillante, Read and Schwarz (2014) and Shupp, et al. (2013) 238 suggests that offers will rise over time. For the current study we will use the equilibrium offer 239 function as a benchmark for buyer offers in the first period.
240

C. Competition Treatment: Secure Property with a Substitute Parcel 241
In our Competition treatment the buyer faced the two sellers as in the Baseline, but also 242 had the option of buying a substitute parcel of land. The substitute parcel was displayed on 243 participants' screens as a rectangle to the right of the matrix representing the primary parcels.
244
For clarity we will refer to the two fragmented parcels as the "primary parcels" and their owners 245 as the "primary sellers." We will refer to the owner of the substitute parcel as the "alternative 246 seller." The buyer's induced value for the substitute parcel was 80% of his induced value for the two primary parcels. The substitute parcel was of no additional value to the buyer if he 248 purchased both of the primary parcels.
249
The buyer initially made his offers to the primary sellers as in the Baseline. If one or 250 both of them rejected his offer, the buyer then submitted an offer to the alternative seller. The 251 delay cost for the period was only incurred if the alternative seller rejected her offer. Contracts 252 were contingent, as above.
253
The alternative seller had a valuation for her parcel, , that was drawn from the uniform
. Notice that the expected surplus from assembling the 255 primary parcels was ( ) ( ) , while the expected surplus from 256 buying the substitute parcel was 0.8 ( ) ( ) , so purchasing the 257 substitute parcel was not socially optimal on average.
258
We again use the one-period model as our benchmark. If the buyer is forced to make an 259 offer to the alternative seller, his expected profit function is:
Solving the first order condition of (3) for yields the equilibrium alternative bid function:
This implies that in equilibrium the buyer's expected profit from dealing with the alternative 264 seller is:
Given that failing to assemble the primary parcels will still generate an expected profit of 267 ( ), the buyer's expected profit when he is making an offer to the primary sellers is now:
We may solve the first order condition of (6) for to find the equilibrium offer function:
Comparing the equilibrium offer functions (2) and (7) we see that the presence of the alternative 272 seller reduces the buyer's equilibrium offers to the primary sellers by one third of the expected 273 profit from dealing with the alternative seller.
274
Allowing for multiple periods causes equilibrium behavior to become ambiguous for the 275 reasons discussed in the previous section. However, seller holdout was riskier in the 276 Competition treatment due to the risk that the buyer would commit to a contract with the 277 competing party (or parties). Consequently, we expect to see less seller holdout in this 278 environment.
279
D. Eminent Domain Treatment 280
In the Eminent Domain treatment the buyer was allowed to force a seller who had 281 rejected his offer to sell. This was done by clicking a button labelled "Force Sale" next to a 282 seller's property. If the buyer invoked eminent domain the fair market value was decided 283 through a simulated litigation process. The price the buyer paid was determined by the amount 284 he and the seller spent on litigation. Neither the buyer nor the seller were allowed to spend so 285 much that they could make negative earnings. The most the seller could spend was equal to the low price that could result from the contest. The most that the buyer could spend was calculated 287 based on his value and any price he had already agreed to or other contest he was in. This 288 maximum was set so that even if the buyer had to pay the high price in the contest his total 289 expenditures would not exceed his value. The delay cost was incurred at the end of a period only 290 if at least one seller rejected her offer and the buyer did not force her to sell.
291
If the buyer and seller spent nothing then the fair market value was 50, the lower bound 292 of the seller's value distribution. This is consistent with a prevailing market price of land less 293 than or equal to all landowner's valuations. If one or both spent an amount greater than zero 294 then the fair market price was assessed to be 40 if the buyer won the contest and 60 if the seller 295 won. 4 The winner was determined probabilistically, with the probability that one contestant wins 296 equal to the amount he spends in the contest divided by the sum of both contestants' spending.
297
Notice that the litigation process effectively offered the buyer and seller a prize equal to 20, the 298 difference between the high and low prices. We may therefore analyze the legal process as a 299 simple Tullock Contest. It is straightforward to show that with two players the Nash Equilibrium 300 in such a contest is for each party to spend one fourth of the prize (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 301 2011). Thus, we would expect the buyer and seller to each spend 5 points if the buyer forced a 302 sale.
303
Of course, the influence costs of a court battle should act as a deterrent to invoking 304 eminent domain in the first place. The buyer knows that if he takes the seller to court the seller's 305 expected profit will be equal to the expected price she will receive minus the amount she spends 306 in court costs. Thus, the buyer's optimal bid offers the sellers an amount that leaves them 307 indifferent between accepting his offer and going to court. Given our parameters this means that distributions from which values would be drawn. An experimenter read the instructions aloud 331 from a script, pausing at predetermined points to elicit questions and answer them. We projected 332 screenshots of the user interface on a screen at the front of the laboratory. 333 We described the decision space as neutrally as possible to focus the participants' 334 attention on their own profit calculations rather than their personal feelings about eminent 335 domain. We called the parcels of land "inputs" that the buyer wished to purchase and referred to 336 a "forced sale" rather than eminent domain or condemnation, and a "contest" rather than a 337 litigation process.
338
Negotiations in all treatments were strictly private. Sellers never saw one another's 339 offers, nor were they informed whether another seller had accepted her offer except when the 340 buyer succeeded in assembling the primary inputs or bought the alternative input. In the Eminent 341 Domain treatment sellers did not know if the other seller in their group had been forced to sell.
342
When competing in a contest neither contestant was told how much their opponent had spent.
343
Each experiment session consisted of 3 rounds. Each round was a separate negotiation.
344
Participants took the same role in every round, but were matched into different groups. To keep 345 the negotiations independent across rounds we re-matched the participants so that they were 346 never grouped with any of the same counterparts more than once. This prevented participants 347 from rewarding or punishing one another for their decisions in prior rounds. indistinguishable between the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatment (p = 0.971), but it was 474 statistically significantly higher in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline (p = 0.012) and
475 Eminent Domain treatments (p = 0.045).
476
[ Table 5 Here] 477 In Table 5 we provide complete information regarding the number of points that could 478 have been earned in each treatment, along with how many points were earned and the number of 479 points that were lost due to the various possible sources of inefficiency. In the Baseline 480 participants failed to capture a total of 1,498 points, or 18.1% of the available surplus. Of these, 481 1,237 points (82.6%) were lost due to delay, and 225 (15%) were lost due to assembly failure. 482 We have already noted that both sellers and buyers held out in the form of rejected offers above 483 seller's values and offers below Nash equilibrium. Which form of holdout cost more in terms of 484 lost gains from trade? We addressed this question by simulating two counterfactuals: a no seller 485 holdout (NSH) counterfactual and a no buyer holdout (NBH) counterfactual. For the NSH 486 counterfactual we simulated buyers whose offers were identical to those submitted by the human buyers and sellers who accepted all offers that were greater than or equal to their value. 5 This 488 allows us to measure how efficient the negotiations would have been without seller holdout, 489 holding observed buyer decisions constant. We conducted 45 simulations for the NSH 490 counterfactual; one for each negotiation in the experiments.
491
For the NBH counterfactual we simulated buyers who submitted their equilibrium offers 492 and sellers who accepted the offers probabilistically. We constructed an acceptance probability those in the NSH and NBH counterfactuals. As the chart makes clear, buyer holdout was more 504 detrimental to efficiency than seller holdout. In the NSH counterfactual the average efficiency 505 was 84%; only 2.8 percentage points higher than the observed Baseline efficiency. For the NBH 506 counterfactual the average efficiency was 90.2%; 9 percentage points higher than the human 507 participants achieved. Both of these differences are statistically significant according to 508 Wilcoxon sign rank tests (p = 0.033 for NSH, p < 0.001 for NBH). Notice that average 509 efficiency was higher in the NBH simulations than in our benchmark simulations. This is counterfactual (wide range) we followed the estimates of Chang (2010) that litigated range from 555 50% below fair market value (25 points) to 50% above it (75 points).
556
In our narrow range counterfactual average efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment 557 increased to 87.6%, statistically significantly greater than the Baseline (Mann-Whitney test, p = 558 0.022). This indicates that where courts face less uncertainty over fair market value eminent 559 domain is likely to be more efficient. However, in the wide range counterfactual the average 560 efficiency is 61.4%, which is statistically significantly less than the Baseline (Mann-Whitney 561 test, p = 0.031). Given that the wide range counterfactual is based on empirical estimates, it is 562 reasonable to treat the results of our laboratory experiments as an optimistic comparison of the 563 efficiency of eminent domain versus sovereign property rights. We advise caution in relying on 564 these counterfactual results, however, because they rely on the assumption that spending 565 strategies do not vary with the range of litigated prices.
566
Theoretically, sellers should accept any offer of 45 points or higher, and the average first 567 offer in the Eminent Domain treatment was 56 points. Thus, we would expect litigation to be 568 infrequent, but that was not the case. The buyer invoked eminent domain against at least one 569 seller in 44.4% of negotiations and against both sellers in 11.1% of negotiations. As a result, 570 participants spent 1,149 points to influence the fair market price. This accounts for 73.9% of all 571 points lost in the Eminent Domain treatment and 13.7% of the maximum available surplus.
572
Notice that this is almost the same amount that was lost due to delay in the Baseline. What 573 eminent domain gave through faster negotiation it took away through influence costs.
574
V. General Discussion
575
The results of these experiments push our understanding about eminent domain and 576 collective action in three ways. First, we find thatcontrary to the conventional wisdoma large majority of sellers do not hold out even when the buyer has no alternative to assembly or 578 recourse to eminent domain. Rather, in our experiments it was primarily the buyers who held out 579 for an outsized share of the surplus by making offers that were below the profit maximizing 580 level, and buyer holdout was 3 times as costly as seller holdout. It seems a perverse response 581 under such circumstances to give buyers the right to cut short the bargaining process and force 582 the sale of property. 80.6% *** Percent of sellers forced to sell --------0% 33.3% *** Buyer's average contest spending --------5 15.7 ** Seller's average contest spending --------5 15.9 *** † Differs from benchmark at p < 0.10 * Differs from benchmark at p < 0.05 ** Differs from benchmark at p < 0.01 *** Differs from benchmark at p < 0.001 
